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Abstract
“Rebuild by Design” è un concorso di progettazione interdisciplinare che ha avuto come obietti-
vo quello di supportare la resilienza della regione di New York a seguito del passaggio dell’ura-
gano Sandy. Questo contributo esplora l’effettiva possibilità per un concorso di progettazione 
come “Rebuild by Design” di rappresentare una risposta plausibile ed efficace per obiettivi di re-
cupero post-disastri naturali e lo fa leggendo criticamente 23 interviste condotte con i principa-
li attori coinvolti nel concorso. I risultati delle interviste sono utilizzati sia per comprendere quali 
aspetti del concorso hanno funzionato e quali no, sia per fornire una prima analisi critica dei sei 
progetti vincitori. L’articolo discute in conclusione gli elementi del concorso che paiono più pro-
mettenti e quali dovrebbero invece essere rivisti nel caso il concetto di “recovery-through-com-
petition” trovi riscontro anche al di fuori della regione di New York.
Parole chiave
Cambiamento climatico, concorso di progettazione, aree costiere, coinvolgimento della comu-
nità, pianificazione adattiva.
Abstract
Rebuild by Design was a four-stage, interdisciplinary design competition aimed at bolstering the 
resilience of the New York region after Hurricane Sandy. This paper explores the extent to which 
a design competition like Rebuild by Design can be considered a viable form of disaster recov-
ery. This includes the use of twenty-three key informant interviews conducted with the principal 
actors involved in the competition are analysed. Their results are then used to both understand 
what features of the competition worked well – and which did not – and to provide the first crit-
ical analysis of the six winning proposals. This paper concludes by discussing the programmatic 
elements of Rebuild by Design that hold promise for future application and by identifying those 
which must be reformed if the notion of recovery-through-competition is to find success outside 
of the New York region. 
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Research Objectives and Methods
“Rebuild by Design”, was a four-stage, interdisci-
plinary design competition aimed at bolstering the 
resilience of the New York region after Hurricane 
Sandy (2012), represents a unique opportunity for 
understanding the extent to which a design compe-
tition can be considered a viable form of post-disas-
ter recovery policy. At this stage in the competition’s 
development, that understanding is best built 
through qualitative, case study research (Francis, 
2001). This is due to the fact that none of Rebuild’s 
proposals have yet been constructed and many 
have yet to progress beyond the conceptual phase 
of development. The paucity of built and highly re-
fined project plans means that more quantitative 
modes of understanding – whether it be from per-
formance-based evaluations of new infrastructure 
or from simulation models of newly proposed sys-
tems – are not yet appropriate. Rebuild’s viability as 
an element of the post-disaster recovery process, 
then, is what this paper aims to qualitatively assess 
(Creswell, 2012; Yin, 2013). 
Implicit in this approach is the need to understand 
how the recovery-through-competition model dif-
fers from that of the status quo, as well as which 
elements of the model worked well and which did 
not for Rebuild’s stakeholders. Semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with twenty-three key 
informants from three distinct stakeholder groups: 
the ten design teams working within the compe-
tition, the key neighborhood groups engaged by 
each team, and the institutional staff tasked with 
administering Rebuild. The primary goal of these 
interviews was to provide a fuller understanding 
of the factors that contributed to the successes 
and failures of the competition from the perspec-
tive of those most-affected by it. These interviews 
ranged in duration from thirty-eight to ninety-three 
minutes and took place in Philadelphia, New York, 
Boston, and New Orleans between September and 
December 2014. The interviews were then tran-
scribed and assessed in order to identify key themes 
regarding Rebuild’s successes and challenges. Once 
a codebook for the interview transcripts was devel-
oped, the coding protocol was shared with and used 
by eight masters-level students to assist in coding 
transcripts and performing validity checks on the fi-
nal results (Ravitch and Rabin, 2011; Maxwell, 2012).
Fig. 1 — The Organizational Ecology 
of Rebuild by Design (Credit: 








Results: The Major Themes Within the Key Infor-
mant Interviews
The interview analysis produced nine themes re-
lated to the question of a design competition’s vi-
ability in the post-disaster recovery process, four of 
which relate to the drivers of Rebuild’s success and 
five of which pertain to its key failures.
The Drivers of Rebuild’s Success
The interview participants identified four themes 
considered critical to Rebuild’s success: the empha-
sis on “coalition-building” throughout the compe-
tition, the focus on “applied research” during the 
early stages of the competition, the “political cover” 
provided by that permitted teams to bring long-
held ideas and aspirations for coastal resilience to 
the fore, and the “strong leadership” exhibited by 
Henk Ovink and Shaun Donovan throughout the 
competition.
First, the theme of coalition-building encapsulates 
the variety of mechanisms through which the ten 
design teams collaborated with neighborhood or-
ganizations and individual residents during the 
research, conceptual development, and design pro-
posal development phases of the competition. In-
terview participants often emphasized this theme’s 
significance by underscoring the importance of cre-
ating durable community coalitions for the projects 
produced by Rebuild – a factor that became more 
important within this context when it became clear 
that the winning design teams would not necessar-
ily be involved in refining and eventually delivering 
the projects they proposed. One designer described 
this theme by saying that 
I think the biggest things are that [the proposal] is 
driven by what – in that neighborhood – was an un-
precedented consensus about a plan for the future 
that brought together businesses, the community, 
and the unions…and this [became] the best place 
to demonstrate what you could through communi-
ty-based action with significant public and private 
investments [through a design competition].
Second, the theme of focusing on applied research 
speaks to the considerable emphasis with Rebuild’s 
programmatic structure on interdisciplinary re-
search. Though using applied research methods to 
construct of knowledge base for decision-making 
purposes is commonplace in most planning process-
es, it is a relatively novel addition to the structure 
of a design competition. Interview participants of-
ten discussed the importance of Rebuild’s research 
phase by discussing the ways in which the freedom 
it offered – namely the ability to pursue a variety 
of problems and topics that interested each of the 
teams – differed from the conventional model of 
practice in which client-driven work is structured 




many of potential research questions have either 
already been answered or have been deemed unnec-
essary to the project, leaving firms in a reactionary 
posture rather than a proactive, inquisitive one. An-
other designer described this theme by saying that
It was great because it gave us a chance to just do 
research and explore many of the topics that we 
were already interested in, rather than someone 
saying ‘we just want to do the High Line but in D.C.’ 
That’s like 90% of the competitions that you get 
and that’s just not interesting or important to me. 
What is interesting are these questions and the 
open-endedness [of the research phase] in Rebuild 
– that really suited us in the end because it was a 
chance to just explore.
Third, the theme of political cover arose throughout 
the interview process and proved particularly im-
portant for the design teams engaged in Rebuild. 
This is due to the competition’s ability to main-
stream a set of ideas – namely, coastal green infra-
structure – that comprise set long-held design aspi-
rations for the region. Interview participants often 
spoke about the ways in which Rebuild represented 
a policy window through which these ideas could fi-
nally be realized (Stone, 2001). A designer described 
the importance of this theme by saying that
What’s interesting is that you could have – and I think 
the Rising Current exhibition (at MoMA) is an exam-
ple – big ideas that are potentially useful, but if you 
don’t have a clear framework for creating a project, 
they don’t mean much. So here you had the money, 
the people, the stakeholders, and the kind of policy 
framework to allow those ideas to happen…What 
was particularly exciting about Rebuild was this idea 
that not only are we developing these big ideas, but 
that there are real dollars attached to them.
Finally, the theme of strong leadership also 
emerged during the interview process – though at 
a rate and intensity far less than the findings of the 
Urban Institute’s Rebuild evaluation suggest (Mar-
tin, Oo, Pendall, Levy, and Baum, 2014). A neighbor-
hood organization leader described this theme by 
saying that
I loved the charisma that Henk brought to this pro-
cess and the attempt to open our bureaucracy up…
and he formed a really effective alliance with Shaun 
Donovan that got a lot of people fired up.
The Major Barriers to Rebuild’s Success
The interview participants identified five themes 
that dramatically reduced the effectiveness of 
Rebuild as a disaster recovery instrument: the un-
realistic expectations of the competition’s admin-
istrators, the lack of resources available to teams 
and participants in the competition, the ineffective 
management style of the competition’s adminis-
trators, the politicized nature of the competition’s 
funding awards, and the highly compressed timeline 
of the recovery process.
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Fig. 2 — The Timeline for Rebuild by 









First, the theme of unrealistic expectations de-
scribes the myriad of ways in which the competi-
tion’s administrators over-promised results. For de-
sign teams, this often meant that financial resourc-
es that were promised failed to materialize and, 
more importantly, that the scope of work agreed 
to before the competition tended to expand expo-
nentially as time went on. The issue came to head 
at the conclusion of the project, when design teams 
were notified hours before the winning proposals 
were selected that they would not necessarily be 
procured to continue working on their projects. For 
neighborhood groups, this theme often arose when 
discussing the competition’s engagement process 
– one which required design teams to meet with 
many more communities than could ever be fund-
ed. In those instances, the asymmetry of informa-
tion – namely, the administrators and design teams 
knowing that most communities involved in the 
planning process would never receive funding when 
the neighborhood groups did not – became highly 
problematic. One designer described this theme by 
saying that
The second element of the competition which made 
it relatively unique is that not only must you de-
sign a project, but you had to build a coalition and 
basically make a business case all on your own. You 
could argue that is has been almost offensive from 
RBD to ask us to do that. Especially then after sort 
of granting the money [to the city] and creating a 
situation in which we don’t know if we’ll be procured 
[to continue working on our own project].
The unrealistic expectations of the competition’s 
administrators also contributed to significant levels 
of distrust from the other groups engaged in Re-
build. Another designer described this simmering 
distrust by saying that
The thing I would change if I had to do this all over 
again is that I would not trust HUD to broker the 
deal with the city…we were all under the impression 
that HUD was going to do more to shape the agenda 
with the grantees…but based on our experience and 
my conversations with colleagues in other jurisdic-
tions, they have been very weak.
Second, the theme regarding a lack of resourc-
es identified the challenges for design teams and 
neighborhood groups that were often asked – and 
sometimes forced – to work on their proposals 
without remuneration. Design teams were each 
granted 200,000 dollars to complete work on the 
competition, though all ten teams spent signifi-
cantly more over the course of Rebuild due to two 
factors: the funding granted to each team was in-
sufficient to cover initial estimated costs and the 
continuous scope creep mandated by the competi-
tion’s administrators forced teams to produce work 
and attend meetings that were never contractually 




amounts of a firm or university’s money in order to 
participate in the competition likely precluded many 
smaller firms and public universities from partici-
pating in Rebuild. One designer described this bar-
rier by noting that
The other thing [I would do differently] is that we 
would definitely change our budget, because they 
told us that there was a lot more money than they 
ever wound up disbursing. We geared our budget 
towards what they said they would have…and if we 
had known, we would have scaled our operations 
way back.
Third, the theme of ineffective management en-
capsulates the many issues that arose due to the 
poor communication and haphazard organizations 
of the events, community meetings, and other re-
quired activities developed by the competition’s 
administrators. Several of the design teams and 
the neighborhood groups described these activities 
as inefficient uses of their time – either because a 
lack of communication meant the meetings were 
poorly attended or because the haphazard organi-
zation of the events meant that little was actually 
accomplished. One designer described this theme 
by saying that
I was not a big fan of all the intermediary involve-
ment in the competition…Some of them could have 
contributed their thoughts for free just like all of the 
community members did. Instead, they were ‘man-
aging stuff’ – very badly – and for all of us, if you ask 
people, one of the big taxes of this process was…in 
addition to us working way beyond the stipend on a 
really tight schedule and then changing the deliver-
ables and the due dates all the time…was they were 
setting up these master classes for us to attend 
that were not master classes at all…then Shaun 
moves to OMB, the [Rockefeller] Foundation moves 
on to a national competition…and now you can’t get 
them to answer an email.
Fourth, the theme of highly politicized results de-
scribes the perception from several design teams 
and neighborhood groups that the projects winning 
proposals were selected, at least in part, for political 
reasons. This is not a particularly surprising finding – 
the distribution of post-disaster recovery funding is 
often a highly politicized act. But the presence of this 
theme is disconcerting here because it cuts against 
the very spirit of a competition. One neighborhood 
group leader described this theme by saying that
I read the other day that the two projects that are 
going to be funded in New Jersey are in the Hudson 
River Valley and in the Meadowlands – North Jersey. 
Frankly, my reaction to those selections is that they 
have far more to do with politics than with anything 
related to storm impact of vulnerability.
Finally, the theme of timeline compression describes 
the chaotic nature of organizing and participat-
ing in a design competition during a period of pro-








post-disaster recovery processes (Kim and Olshan-
sky, 2014), though it was likely exacerbated in the 
case of Rebuild by the other themes previously de-
scribed. One neighborhood group leader described 
this theme by saying that
One of the biggest challenges was that we were just 
trying to do too much in too little time…I wonder if, 
in the end, that had an impact on our application…I 
think the time crunch – people just got so wrapped 
up in the planning process that when it came down 
to actually writing [our funding application] and 
building a case [for our city], it just wasn’t as tight as 
it should have been.
Discussion: Can We Rebuild by Design?
However, flawed the recovery-through-competition 
model of disaster recovery appears, the findings 
from this paper demonstrate that, at least in the 
case of Rebuild, such an approach merits further 
development—particularly when one considers the 
spectacular failure of more conventional models to 
build resilience in US cities.
The Conditions Necessary to Rebuild by Design
There are at least two conditions that contributed to 
Rebuild’s success in the New York region and pertain 
to its replicability elsewhere. The first is socio-polit-
ical: New York and many of the surrounding munic-
ipalities are very high-resource, high-capacity plan-
ning cities. Rebuild’s strong institutional partner-
ships with the Municipal Arts Society, the Van Allen 
Institute, and the NYU Institute for Public Knowl-
edge – all with highly-skilled staff that are experi-
enced in community engagement and city planning 
– helped to create a powerful network of support 
that greatly benefitted teams during the competi-
tion. The competition’s institutional partners also 
provided the social infrastructure necessary to car-
ry the projects forward after Rebuild’s conclusion. 
Though these conditions are not unique to New 
York, they are far from ubiquitous. It would be dif-
ficult to imagine a similar process unfolding in New 
Orleans after Katrina, given the city’s low level of 
philanthropic activity and planning capacity (Dewar 
and Manning-Thomas, 2012; Ford, 2011). The Rocke-
feller Foundation already appears to recognize this 
necessity – a critical component of the Foundation’s 
NDRC program is a series of “Resilience Workshops” 
aimed at building technical expertise within disas-
ter stricken cities across the country.
The second condition is a symmetrical flow of in-
formation between the organizers, participants, 
and communities engaged in the recovery process. 
For the organizer-designer relationship, the rules 
of the game must be well understood by both par-
ties. This means that the financial constraints of 




well-known, that the agreed-upon scope of work 
is a fixed component of the process, and that the 
post-competition procurement and intellectual 
property agreements are explicit before a decision 
is made to engage in the program. Put another way, 
the hectic nature of any post-disaster recovery pro-
cess cannot be exacerbated by shifting standards, 
rules, and regulations on the part of a design com-
petition’s administrators. For the organizer-com-
munity relationship, the intentions and values of 
each party must be made explicit at the onset of 
the competition. This means that organizers must 
be clear about two things: whether their engage-
ment with the neighborhood is intended to solicit 
feedback on a proposal or to invite residents to truly 
engage in the design process; and whether or not 
there are tangible guarantees for planning-fatigued 
communities – like eligibility for federal funding – to 
participate in yet another engagement process.
The Programmatic Reforms Necessary to Rebuild by 
Design
At least two programmatic reforms are necessary 
for the recovery-through-competition model to be 
considered viable in other disaster-stricken con-
texts. The first is that the financial structure of de-
sign competitions must be amended to permit entry 
by smaller firms, public universities, and non-profit 
organizations. The exorbitant cost of Rebuild proved 
difficult to manage for nearly all of the teams in-
volved – all of which had at least one large firm or 
private university attached to them. These teams 
were able to make-up for the heavy losses imposed 
by Rebuild by cross-subsidizing their involvement 
through other projects and profit centers. Smaller 
firms, public universities, and non-profit organi-
zations could never operate in this fashion. This is 
problematic because limiting the size and type of 
organizations able to participate in a competition 
like Rebuild also limits the universe of ideas about 
disaster recovery, climate change adaptation, and 
community engagement that a more diverse orga-
nizational pool could provide. Future competitions 
must provide more resources for participating firms.
The second is that investments like Rebuild must 
shift from a reactionary posture to a proactive 
one. The NDRC, though different from Rebuild in 
important ways, is similarly focused on communi-
ties in which disaster recovery, rather than disaster 
preparedness, is the primary concern. As HUD, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, and other organizations 
engaged in these competitions look forward, their 
investments should be targeted towards cities 
with high levels of exposure to natural hazards 
and climate change, but little in the way of recent 








saster recovery period is hectic and often involves 
the mass displacement of residents and technical 
experts – all of which complicate efforts to rebuild 
cities that are more resilient to future crises. By 
focusing on cities of high risk instead, future com-
petitions can help initiative a proactive process of 
climate change adaptation planning that is more 
deliberate, more efficient, and more inclusive than 
the Rebuild and NDRC models suggest.
The Promise and Peril of Rebuild’s Design Proposals
Rebuild produced in 2014 six winning proposals: the 
BIG U, or Dryline, for Southern Manhattan by the 
Bjarke Ingels Group and One Architecture; the Liv-
ing Breakwaters for Staten Island by SCAPE/Land-
scape Architecture; the Lifelines for Hunt’s Point 
(the Bronx) by PennDesign and Olin; the Resist/
Delay/Store/Discharge project for the Hudson Riv-
er by OMA; the New Meadowlands by MIT’s Center 
for Advanced Urbanism and ZUS + Urbanisten; and 
the Resilient Bridgeport Plan for Connecticut by WB 
unabridged and Waggonner and Ball Architects. The 
latter three—comprehensive plans, now under the 
management of local and state governments—are 
impossible to evaluate at this point. The former 
three, however, are not.
The Dryline proposal is a surge barrier system com-
prised of three key elements: (1) the Battery Berm, 
(2) the Bridging Berm, and (3) a retractable flood-
wall running parallel to portions of FDR Drive. If 
completed, the project would span some ten miles 
of waterfront, wrapping around the southern tip of 
Manhattan from East 40th street, across the Lower 
East Side, the Village, and up to West 54th Street. 
Each berm would anchor a sweeping system of 
green, coastal infrastructure aimed at integrating 
recreation and risk reduction around one of the most 
densely populated and wealthy enclaves in the Unit-
ed States. The retractable barriers would serve as a 
connection between those earthen berms. Togeth-
er, the three core elements of the U-shaped system 
aim to completely reshape Manhattan’s waterfront 
by creating a dry line of defense against future surge 
events. It also clearly builds upon and draws from 
the “New Urban Ground” proposal developed by 
dlandstudio during the “Rising Currents” exhibition. 
Susannah Drake, author of that project, noted that 
New Urban Ground “is more than a response to the 
need to control the input and outflow of water; it 
also provides an opportunity to transform the urban 
experience” (Bergdoll, 2011). In many ways, Drake’s 
soft-U for Manhattan laid the intellectual ground-
work for BIG to develop the Dryline. BIG’s proposal 
received 335 million dollars in RBD funding, the high-





But the project’s transformation of Southern Man-
hattan’s waterfront raises some important con-
cerns about the proposal – and, more generally, the 
RBD competition. The first phase of the Dryline – a 
2.5 mile segment running from Montgomery Street 
to East 23rd Street – is projected to cost more than 
one billion dollars. Implementing that one, small 
section of the Dryline will take years – building all 
or most of the proposal is likely to take decades. 
This is problematic for at least three reasons. One 
is that RBD failed to identify a long-term funding 
or management strategy for its winning proposals. 
The more time that passes, the less likely the City 
of New York or its federal partners are to prioritize 
funding for the Dryline. Construction costs become 
more expensive, environmental regulations become 
more stringent, and political support becomes less 
intense as more time passes.
For this project in particular, a partially built Dryline 
would be devastating for residents of Southern 
Manhattan. One of the project’s designers remarked 
that “the compartments [of the Dryline]…while 
something in and of themselves, are connected to 
each other and create a system of flood protection 
that is greater than the sum of all its part”. The sys-
tem of flood-protection cannot function until a full 
buildout is achieved—a dwindling prospect given the 
rise of austerity politics in the United States.
The Dryline proposal is comprised of a several one-
to-three-mile-long compartments that, unless 
connected, cannot provide any real degree of flood 
protection. That’s because the project is designed 
using a resistance-based approach to resilience, 
pushing water away from the neighborhoods pro-
tected by the Dryline. All of that displaced water 
must go elsewhere and, until the entire U is com-
pleted, that elsewhere will be the neighborhoods 
of Southern Manhattan that are adjacent to its 
completed segments. At its best, the Dryline will be 
of great benefit to the residents of Southern Man-
hattan and incredible cost to their neighbors. At its 
worst, it will protect a few wealthy pockets of peo-
ple in and around the Financial District and leave the 
rest of Manhattan to fend for itself.
Of course, some areas must receive the first round 
of protection over others. But who receives it – and 
who does not – is a political choice, a product of the 
resilience politics of coastal design. Giving that first 
round of protection to the wealthiest enclave in 
Manhattan means that other, lower capacity neigh-
borhoods will remain exposed to storm surge and cli-
mate change longer – and bear the considerable risk 
of being among the neighborhoods included in the 
Dryline plan, but excluded from whatever portions of 
it are actually built. This is not the fault of the de-







2017 timately make that decision. But the Dryline propos-
al – and its compartmentalized nature – lends itself 
to this kind of political exploitation and, in that re-
gard, presents a cautionary tale for other designers.
The second issue is a product of the programmat-
ic structure of the RBD competition. Because only 
one team worked on the Southern Manhattan site, 
New Yorkers have mostly been denied an opportu-
nity to debate competing proposals for how best to 
protect the borough. Though this became a compe-
tition-wide issue, it is acutely troublesome for the 
Dryline given its high cost – no other funded project 
is expected to approach its massive price tag. It is al-
so disappointing, given that, in all likelihood, what-
ever was proposed for Manhattan during the RBD 
competition would have been awarded substantial 
public funding. There are simply too many people 
and too many commercial assets there to leave un-
protected. A designer from a competing RBD team 
noted that 
they were always going to build something there…
that’s why so many teams wanted the Southern 
Manhattan site. They knew they could propose 
almost anything and it would get built…because 
that’s the locus of financial and political power in 
this city and that’s who we all knew would get pro-
tection first.
The final challenge presented by the Dryline is both 
philosophical and functional: it treats nature as an 
ornamental quality instead of an instrumental pro-
cess. By that I mean that the project is emblematic 
of the shift in design culture to portray resilience 
and climate change adaptation as problems easily 
solved through green-washing. Projects can cer-
tainly do both – project an image that romanticizes 
nature and delivers on its promise of resilience. But 
that is a fine line to walk.
Though verdant and socially vibrant renderings 
might appeal to clients and portions of the public, 
they often elide past the more serious technical and 
functional issues that must be addressed in coastal 
resilience projects. A public official in New York City 
noted that 
Developers love [the Dryline] because it’s a plan to 
completely redevelop the Lower East Side – that’s 
not the LES any of us in New York know. They’re 
going to erase life as we know it and replace it with 
architectural objects. It will beget a huge number of 
new higher-end residential buildings, and yet the 
Governor and Mayor and the designers will all come 
to the Alfred Smith houses to hold a press confer-
ence about the project…It’s not going to work out 
well for their community partners…but they weren’t 
really interested in them anyway. This is a tool for 
redevelopment, not resilience.
The greatest risk facing the Dryline, then, is that its 
core elements will be built – in part of whole – while 
its other, more compelling components are stripped 




partners cost-engineering away the parks, gardens, 
and architectural interventions in the proposal and 
building a fairly simply – and droll – berm and wall 
system along the coast. Because the proposal’s 
most compelling parts are layered on top of those 
core, protective elements – rather than integrated 
into them – they risk being discarded if and when 
the project’s costs become a political liability.
The SCAPE proposal for Staten Island is organized 
around a series of oyster reefs and other designed 
ecologies along the shore. The reefs – first proposed 
as a part of Kate Orff’s “Oyster-tecture” project 
in the “Rising Currents” exhibition – are relative-
ly simple propositions (Bergdoll, 2011). The Living 
Breakwaters act to reduce wave energy and to im-
prove local water quality by using human-built reef 
structures to attract oysters and shellfish that can 
both filter pollutants and revitalize a long-lost fish-
ing and eco-tourism-based recreation industry. The 
near-shore interventions are then coupled with ar-
chitectural and programmatic elements along the 
beach in an attempt to “stitch the culture and ecol-
ogy of Staten Island’s waterfront together.” Those 
“water hubs” – or community and recreational facil-
ities along the shore – would act as social anchors, 
providing waterborne recreation opportunities, new 
public space, and marine education programming to 
the neighborhoods of Staten Island. One of the proj-
ect’s designers described it by saying that
the hope is that these core elements – the breakwa-
ters and the water hubs – could become like a tool-
kit…that the City of New York could then take and 
distribute all along the outer boroughs…so that this 
one small pilot in Staten Island becomes a blueprint 
for recovering a marine ecology that used to thrive 
here.
SCAPE’s project is an exercise in prototyping that 
is intended to spread, over time, across the coastal 
edge of the Northeast. The Living Breakwaters pro-
posal received $60 million in funding through RBD.
It is certainly true that the modularity of SCAPE’s 
proposal hews closely to one of the central tenets 
of resilience theory – that robust systems are com-
prised of redundant, overlapping elements that 
each provide a multitude of functions. Its creative 
use of shellfish as an organizing device also clear-
ly fulfills the RBD competition’s desire for design 
innovation. But the project’s reliance upon oysters 
and other bivalves creates a troubling vulnerability 
in its logic. Ocean acidification – a chemical pro-
cess in which atmospheric CO2 is rapidly dissolved 
into the ocean, raising its pH level – is one of the 
first global climate change effects to materialize. 
It is also one of the most difficult to address. It is 
already wreaking havoc on the oyster and mussel 








lantic. There, increasing oceanic acidity is dissolving 
the shells of bivalves, making it harder for them to 
live long enough to breed and to provide the kinds 
of water quality benefits that are part and parcel to 
the Living Breakwaters proposal (Bednarsek et al, 
2012). These effects are projected to escalate over 
the next century, potentially collapsing the oyster 
and mussel fisheries of North America (Freely et 
al, 2014). Though there is merit in investing in solu-
tions that buy communities 20 or 50-years of pro-
tection – and Living Breakwaters may do that – this 
proposal is being framed as a solution to flood risk, 
not an instrument for forestalling the inevitable.
Living Breakwaters also faces some vexing techni-
cal questions. The marine science literature is nearly 
unanimous in its assessment of near-shore reefs 
like these: they could provide some shoreline stabi-
lization benefits, but would not do much to reduce 
surge risk. This is mostly due to the hydrodynamic 
characteristics of coastal storm events. Their max-
imum surge – the maximum flood height delivered 
by the storm – is always preceded by a forerunner. 
A forerunner is the pre-surge – a dramatic increase 
in wave heights that can reach as high as 75% of 
the maximum surge height. A marine scientist in 
New York noted that 
One of the reasons near shore reefs don’t do much 
for surge heights is that, by the time the big surge 
arrives, they’ve been completely overwhelmed by 
the forerunner…If the peak surge is fifteen feet, it’ll 
have a forerunner of at least seven or eight…and as 
soon as you put that on top of a breakwater, it loses 
all of its frictional qualities.
Another marine scientist noted that 
[breakwaters] can do a lot for you in terms of re-
ducing the everyday wave action…that’s driven by 
wind and tidal action…That reduces coastal erosion, 
so you can certainly make an argument in their fa-
vor that way…But they aren’t going to do you any 
good during a major storm event. When you run the 
SLOSH models, it’s like they’re not even there.
A designer working in New York, but unaffiliated 
with the proposal, also said that 
I don’t think that oysters and mussels are going to 
save us. They don’t live past the spat stage around 
Staten Island, so they don’t form those crusty reefs 
that are shown in all of their drawings…and you’d 
need so much width or horizontal area just to get a 
one or two foot reduction in surge heights…Besides, 
the final proposal didn’t even place the reefs where 
ARCADIS told them would be most optimal – about 
¾ of a mile offshore – because it wouldn’t be as sexy.
The risk in this project, then, is less about whether 
enough of it can be built to fulfill its mission than in 
whether it can actually perform as it has been ad-
vertised.
Finally, The Penn/Olin proposal for Hunts Point is 




Flood Protection Levee Lab, a commercialization in-
cubator for testing new materials and methods of 
risk reduction; (2) the Livelihoods Initiative, a local 
job-training program aimed at coupling new neigh-
borhood development with a local, underemployed 
workforce; (3) the Maritime Emergency Supply Line 
Hub, a ship-based logistics hub for coordinating re-
lief efforts during future storm events; and (4) the 
Cleanways tri-generation facility, a local and CO2 
neutral power generating plant.  It also includes 
a series of modest levees aimed at protecting the 
neighborhood’s food distribution center – a critical 
node in the region’s food supply. Nearly twenty mil-
lion people in and around New York receive a portion 
of their daily food supply from Hunts Point – and it 
came within about eighteen inches of being inun-
dated during Sandy. The Lifelines proposal received 
20 million dollars through RBD – the least amount 
amongst the six winning projects.
The Penn/Olin project’s blend of physical infrastruc-
ture, social and economic policy, and energy produc-
tion clearly delivers on the principal aim of RBD: to 
create innovative design solutions to the problem 
of climate change in New York’s most vulnera-
ble neighborhoods. But it also suffers from three 
unique issues that threaten to derail the proposal. 
One is that the Levee Lab creates organizational 
tensions between the community members, the 
city, and the academic institutions that might ad-
minister it. This is because the proposal never re-
solved the management or operational questions 
that such a facility engenders, such as who might 
manage the conventional flood-control systems 
protecting Hunts Point, who might direct the Lab’s 
research agenda, and how those two disparate sys-
tems might intersect. 
A second is that the proposal’s workforce develop-
ment recommendations will be difficult to square, 
both financially and contractually with local labor 
unions. As one of the project’s designers remarked, 
tying the success of new development in a commu-
nity to the wealth and health of its residents is the 
only way to ensure that whatever physical improve-
ments are made [in the Bronx] actually benefit its 
inhabitants…and aren’t just another instrument of 
displacement.
The third and final concern is a product of the com-
petition’s insistence on producing ideas that are 
regionally scalable yet contextually appropriate. 
No other proposal generated during RBD was as at-
tuned to its community as Lifelines. An administra-
tor of the competition remarked that 
no one did it better than in Hunts Point…there are 
plenty of things we’d probably change about it now, 
but they were as engaged with their community…









But Lifelines exposed the paradoxical nature of 
RBD’s aim – its local focus meant that few of the 
proposal’s ideas could be transferrable to other 
neighborhoods.
Conclusions
This paper assessed the viability of the design 
competition – Rebuild by Design – as a method of 
disaster recovery in the post-Sandy Northeast, 
and it critiques the design proposals promulgated 
through Rebuild. Their viability is likely to depend on 
the ability of future competitions to better provide 
more resources to the design teams and neighbor-
hood groups tasked with leading such an effort. 
The projects themselves offer some insight for 
designers, too – particularly as recovery efforts in 
Houston, TX and along the Florida coast begin in 
the aftermath of Hurricanes Harvey and Irma. The 
BIG U’s resistance based approach to resilience is 
likely to find favor in small, densely developed com-
munities where its high-cost can be justified by the 
assets being protected. It’s unlikely that such an 
approach would fit well into the urban landscape 
of Houston, where sprawling, low-density develop-
ment pervades and any surge barrier system would 
have to be massive in scale and expense. Tampa 
and Miami may be better test beds for such an 
approach, though additional, complimentary resil-
ience projects will be necessary alongside whatever 
is built there.
The idea of coupling ecosystem design with flood 
risk reduction in Living Breakwaters is perhaps the 
most scalable idea in all of Rebuild. Well-protected 
inlets and bays should be the ideal places for such 
an approach. More exposed coastal cities—including 
the site of the Rebuild proposal itself—should avoid 
them. As the marine science and engineering litera-
tures makes clear, these types of interventions can-
not have a meaningful impact on storm surge.
The Lifelines proposal’s focus on policy is, at the 
very least, instructive in its recognition that there 
are some problems that landscape design cannot 
solve—and that attempting to stretch the profes-
sion beyond its abilities would both place commu-
nities at unnecessary risk of disaster and undercut 
the credibility of landscape architects. Expertise is 
as much about knowing what you cannot do as it is 
what you can do.
As the notion of resilience continues to permeate 
and capture the public discourse around cities, plan-
ning and design scholars should look to the commu-
nities engaged in that effort to develop additional 
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